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MIRIAM LEONARDIN 2013 SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES were held to mark the ﬁfti-eth anniversary of the publication of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jeru-salem, the text, ﬁrst published in the New Yorker, that turned her into a
renowned and in some quarters reviled public intellectual. That publication
demonstrated a prescience about our contemporary condition which explains
why Arendt remains one of the most provocative interlocutors in discussions
about political ideas and realities today. Arendt’s relevance to the present has
been cemented by the release of a major feature ﬁlm about her account of the
Eichmann trial in 2012. Just a few years later it is with some irony that one
might observe that Eichmann has been displaced as the most resonant of
Arendt’s works. In early 2017, as was widely reported in the press, bookshops
ran out of copies of Arendt’s original masterwork, The Origins of Totalitarian-
ism. In the run-up to Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration, readers had
armed themselves with Arendt’s historical manual to help them get to grips with
the uncanny return of totalitarianism in the age of neo-liberalism.
The striking contemporary relevance of Arendt’s work, however, has not blinded
scholars to the signiﬁcance of its ancient dimension.1 It is difﬁcult not to be struck
by the pervasive reference to antiquity in her political-cum-philosophical treatise
The Human Condition. But its presence can also be felt, for instance, in The Or-
igins of Totalitarianism, where Arendt narrates the Dreyfus affair as the unfold-
ing of a Greek tragedy—a trope that she returns to and develops more fully at the
start of Eichmann in Jerusalem and in the conclusion of her bookOn Revolution.
Rome, as a number of contributors to this special issue elaborate, also plays a sig-
niﬁcant role across her oeuvre.2 The question of how one should understand this
interest in antiquity still requires some thought. One might be tempted to see
Arendt’s ancients as a continuation of the legacy of German philhellenism and
its tenacious grasp on intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Certainly it is possible to see Arendt’s election of the Greeks as a mark of her
debt to Heidegger.3 She shares with her former teacher an investment in Greece
as an originary moment—one that requires an excavation of modernity to re-
trieve. Like Heidegger too, her attachment to the ancient world is a conceptual
one that never advocates a return to the actualities of ancient life. But to see aClassical Philology 113 (2018): 1–5
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1. See, e.g., Euben 2000 and Taminiaux 2000.
2. See Hammer 2002.
3. On Arendt and Heidegger, see Villa 1996. See also Canovan 1990.
1
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.146 on April 19, 2018 05:48:17 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
2 MIRIAM LEONARD
Anod to Heidegger as the ultimate reference of her ancient proclivities would be
reductive. Not least because, as a number of the articles reveal, her Greeks are as
much Nietzsche’s or Marx’s as they are Heidegger’s. More importantly, it is in
her treatment of ancient texts and ancient ideas thatArendt articulates her distance
from and rejection of Heidegger and other aspects of the German intellectual tra-
dition. Her crucial turn away from metaphysics toward politics, for instance, is
hinged around a reading of Plato rather than a debate with Heidegger. Similarly,
her rejection of mortality in favor of natality ﬁnds its source in an analysis of an-
tiquity. Arendt’s ancients, in other words, do not act as an entry ticket into Ger-
man culture but as a way for her to develop a distinct and resistant space within a
tradition that she inhabits but fundamentally reshapes.
Plurality is a feature of Arendt’s work that a number of the articles elaborate,
and one undervalued aspect of Arendt’s ancients is their surprising plurality. At
one level, this might be a surprising claim because the charge of ﬂattening an-
tiquity, of turning the complex and difﬁcult political practices of ancient socie-
ties into a nostalgic utopia has often been leveled against her. Nevertheless, one
of the aims of this special issue is to make readers attentive to Arendt’s less man-
ifest ancient references. To reveal an Arendt who is, for sure, in dialogue with
Plato and Aristotle but also with Augustine and Virgil. For all this, it could be
argued that her ancients are not plural enough, that her immersion in antiquity
remains a limiting dimension of her thought. Her treatment of slavery is a case
in point. Although she is aware that the freedoms enjoyed in the polis were pred-
icated on mass enslavement, such a realization does not seem to change her
opinion about the ancient city. This seeming indifference to ancient slavery is
compounded when she writes approvingly of the American Revolution and com-
pletely omits a reference to the Haitian revolution in her survey of political moder-
nity. At the same time, her discussion of Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery in
The Origins of Totalitarianism is the touchstone in her trenchant analysis of the
plight of refugees in the Second World War:
This was to a certain extent the plight of slaves, whomAristotle therefore did not count among
human beings. Slavery’s fundamental offense against human rights was not that it took liberty
away [. . .], but that it excluded a certain category of people from the possibility of ﬁghting for
freedom [. . .]. Slavery’s crime against humanity did not begin when one people defeated and
enslaved its enemies [. . .] but when slavery became an institution in which some men were
“born” free and others slave, when it was forgotten that it was man who deprived his fellow-
men of freedom, and when the sanction for the crime was attributed to nature.4
Similar questions could be raised about her tacit endorsement of patriarchy. In
choosing that most proudly androcentric of political organizations, does Arendt
invite us to ally her classicism to her masculinism? As Mary Dietz argues:
Arendt’s political vision was decisively (if only metaphorically) Hellenic: the classical Greek
polis was her model of the public; Pericles, the Athenian statesman immortalized by Thu-
cydides, was her exemplary citizen-hero; and the quest for freedom as glory through “self-
revelation” in plurality was her political vision. A political theory so seemingly indebted to
the ancient Greek culture of masculinity and warrior heroes, and to the classical tradition of4. Arendt 1976, 317.
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AWestern thought, was bound to meet with resistance in feminist writings of the 70s and 80s
as participants in the “second wave” began to pursue a woman-centred theory of knowledge
and debunk the patriarchal assumptions of “male-stream” Western political thought.5
In Dietz’s account, it was Arendt’s obsessive return to antiquity that made her so
unpalatable to her early feminist critics. Arendt’s blindness to gender issues was
a byproduct of her investment in the hyper-masculine political structures of the
classical world. In particular, feminists have pointed out that the rigid distinction
that Arendt draws between the public and private realms ﬁnds its support in the
misogynistic practices of the Athenian democratic polis.6 It would follow from
such an account that it is in her relationship to antiquity that Arendt is least re-
ﬂective about questions of gender. And yet, Adriana Cavarero and,more recently,
Bonnie Honig have drawn extensively onArendt in their feminist explorations of
Greek tragedy.7 In addition to exploring the potential of natality, both Honig and
Cavarero in different ways show how Arendt’s analysis of action can provide a
theoretical framework for a performative understanding of gender which opens
up new avenues for exploring the resonance of ancient texts.
Arendt’s apparent deafness to the political marginalization of women and
slaves poses a challenge to the liberal proclivities of much contemporary clas-
sical scholarship. Her provocative writings about tradition and her lionization
of a Western canon of ancient thought similarly go against the grain. Arendt’s
staunch defense of classical culture has been interpreted as an attempt to rescue
the writings of antiquity from their crude appropriation in Nazi thought. But, as
both Katherine Harloe’s and Joy Connolly’s pieces in this special issue make
clear, Arendt’s thinking about the value of historical cultures is more complex
than such a defensive stance would suggest. In a quotation from the essay “What
Is Authority?,” discussed by Connolly, she writes:
With the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast
realms of the past, but this thread was also the chain fettering each successive generation to
a predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open up to us with
unexpected freshness and tell us things no one has yet had ears to hear. But it cannot be denied
that without a securely anchored tradition—and the loss of this security occurred several hun-
dred years ago—the whole dimension of the past has been endangered. We are in danger of
forgetting, and such an oblivion—quite apart from the contents that could be lost—would
mean that, humanely speaking, we would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension
of depth in human existence.8
This passage beautifully captures the ambivalent dynamic of the agencies of the
present over the present and the past(s) over the present which plays such a dis-
tinctive role in Arendt’s own relationship to antiquity. Arendt articulates both the
compulsion to remember and the freedom that each new generation has in ac-
tively recreating the past.
Arendt’s profound immersion in antiquity coupled with such self-consciousness
about the act of reception make it easy to see why she might be of interest to5. Dietz 2002, 101.
6. For a nuanced account of Arendt’s relationship to feminism, see Honig 1995.
7. See Cavarero 2000 and Honig 2013.
8. Arendt 2006, 94.
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Ascholars of classical reception. But Arendt’s interest to classicists can and should
go beyond that. In a felicitous phrase, Arendt makes the past feel imperative. One
of the most valuable aspects of Arendt’s work is that she models our interaction
with the ancients in political rather than historical terms. Arendt’s texts are pop-
ulated by classical ﬁgures, not just Socrates, Plato, andAristotle, Thucydides and
Pericles, but also the nameless demoswho inhabit her imagined polis. Arendt’s
ancients are not historical and in this respect she shares something with other
philosophical readers of ancient texts who conduct their conversations with clas-
sical authors across the chasm of historical and cultural difference. Nevertheless,
Arendt does not treat antiquity as if it were timeless. Rather, she structures the
encounter between ancient andmodern as a political encounter. The ancient texts
intervene into the present as actions rather than actors. The reference to the Greeks
and Romans functions for Arendt as a kind of performative. While lacking the
depth of historical ﬁgures, they nevertheless have a powerful agency that refuses
modern appropriation. In fact, it is the singularity of the Greek experience that
she wishes to reanimate in the present. The appeal she makes to antiquity in her
essay “What Is Freedom?” is exemplary:
Let us therefore go back to antiquity, i.e., to its political and prephilosophical traditions, cer-
tainly not for the sake of erudition, not even because of the continuity of our tradition, but
merely because a freedom experienced in the process of acting and nothing else—though of
course mankind never lost this experience altogether—has never been articulated with the
same classical clarity.9
Arendt acutely pinpoints how in our discussions of antiquity we too often think
about the classical world in terms either of erudition—that is, as a form of his-
toricism—or of continuity. Arendt rejects both those models and in the process
shows how in taking refuge in history we displace politics. Being responsive to
historical alterity constitutes our responsibility only in a restrictive moral sense.
Taking responsibility for antiquity requires returning it to its agency and allowing
it to act in the present. Instead of criticizing her overly nostalgic gaze or rebuking
her for her historical inaccuracies we do better to value the strategic accessibility
Arendt gives us to the past. As Peter Euben writes:
we can gain such access because the ‘polis’ is less a physical entity or speciﬁc historical
conﬁguration than an ever-present possibility, even under the inhospitable conditions of mo-
dernity. The polis, Arendt writes, is ‘not the city-state in its physical location; it is the or-
ganization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together . . . no matter where
they happen to be.’10
Like Nietzsche, who hoped to enlist the “untimeliness” of antiquity to act on the
present and shape the future, Arendt’s gift lies in her ability “ to press the past
into the service of establishing the strangeness of the present.”11
The articles in this collection thus do not so much chart the extensive refer-
ences to antiquity in Arendt’s writings as explore the ways that thinking with
Arendt can help us reevaluate antiquity in its relationship to modernity. The open-9. Arendt 2006, 163.
10. Euben 2000, 162. The citation is from Arendt 1998, 98.
11. Kateb 1984, 149.
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Aing paper by Joy Connolly was ﬁrst delivered at Chicago as theWalsh Lecture in
2016. It looks in detail at Arendt’s understanding of the notions of tradition and
authority. Connolly discovers in Arendt’s references to Rome a parallel for her
understanding of thought as by necessity a “two-in-one” activity. The Roman
awareness of their relations to others models an ethical relationship to the tradi-
tion that can inspire our own engagements with the classical past. Katherine
Harloe returns to the problem of authority as she tackles the question of histo-
riography in Arendt and teases out her distinctive stake in the quarrel between
ancients andmoderns. Arendt emerges from this analysis not just as an opponent
of a powerful tradition of German historicism, but as one who engaged deeply
with the question of the contemporaneity of the “classical.” Harloe thus goes to
the heart of the question of whether Arendt’s return to antiquity makes her a pro-
gressive or a reactionary. Andrew Benjamin, like Connolly, reads Arendt through
Rome and shows how Arendt’s insistence that “men, not man, live on the earth
and inhabit the world” can be read together with Seneca. In particular, he looks
at the concept of nudity as an understanding of human dignity and contrasts the
Senecan conception to Arendt’s own Latin formulation inter homines esse. As in
Connolly’s contribution, relationality emerges as a key concept from Arendt’s
writings on antiquity. Finally, Miriam Leonard looks at the ambivalent role that
the ancients play in Arendt’s understanding of the modern phenomenon of rev-
olution. In Arendt’s hands, revolution upends conventional temporality: classi-
cal antiquity is both inescapable and not yet fully actualized in the modern
experience of political upheaval. In On Revolution, her most hopeful book, the
ancients play a crucial role in Arendt’s exploration of the risks and the potential
of collective action. Taken together, the articles in this collection suggest that
Arendt’s encounter with the ancients holds the key to understanding some of
the most urgent ethical, political, and aesthetic questions of our times.
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